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Abstract 
This article uses evolutionary game theory to reveal the interpersonal and geographic 
characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by terrorist 
organizations and genocide architects. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the 
model, entrepreneurs of violence can create the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people group 
into one that supports or does not resist violence against an out-group. The model is extended into 
geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in Moore 
and von Neumann neighborhoods. The model also reveals policy interventions in which the social 
evolution of aggression never gets started or comes to a halt if already underway. 
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1. Introduction 
Breeders artificially select animal traits by manipulating the animals’ DNA, interactions with 
other animals (e.g., mating, artificial insemination), and environment (e.g., diet, healthcare).  In 
so doing, the breeders create animal phenotypes (traits) that they deem desirable.  The evolution 
of the animals is relatively quick, brought about as it is, not by natural selection, but by artificial 
selection.  Metaphorically, the leaders of terrorist organizations and the architects of genocide 
seek to “breed” certain types of social outcomes by artificially manipulating peoples’ interactions 
with each other and the environments (perceptions of history, culture, etc.) in which they live.  
The social outcomes that the violence entrepreneurs seek to engineer are those that advance their 
tactical and strategic objectives.  For example, at the time of this writing, the Islamic State (IS) 
(formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or ISIS) has unleashed brutalities on 
civilians in parts of Syria and Iraq including mass executions, torture, and beheadings.  Such 
ruthless actions are often on public display, which serves to intimidate people into supporting, or 
not resisting, IS’ rapid conquest and control of territory.  Those who seek to instill peace also 
seek to engineer social outcomes.  Strategic interactions between violence entrepreneurs and 
third-party violence preventers occur in the context of a malleable and dynamic social context in 
which the people within such systems also act according to their interests.  Given the metaphor 
between animal breeding and social system breeding, much of the mathematical machinery of 
evolutionary theory can be adapted to the study of the social evolution of violence and peace.  In 
this article, we take selected aspects of evolutionary game theory dynamics to model how 
terrorist leaders and genocide architects can artificially manipulate a social environment to 
advance their objectives of isolating and destroying people from an out-group.  We apply 
evolutionary mathematics to social evolution as distinct from biological evolution.   
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The article has three objectives.  First, we use evolutionary game theory to identify the 
characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by atrocity 
entrepreneurs (section 2).  Under certain conditions, atrocity entrepreneurs can create the social 
metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that accepts or does not resist aggression 
against an out-group, which we call the “social evolution of aggression.”  Second, we extend the 
analysis into geographic space by modeling interactions among peaceful and aggressive 
phenotypes in two types of geographic areas: Moore and von Neumann (section 3).  Third, we 
analyze policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or 
comes to a halt if already underway (section 4).  We conclude with ideas for future research on 
modeling the social evolution of aggression and a summary of key results (section 5).
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2. Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Social Evolution of Aggression 
We take as given a terrorist organization’s or genocide regime’s objective to intentionally target 
civilians for destruction.  Outside of weapons of mass destruction, atrocity entrepreneurs cannot 
pull off large-scale civilian killings on their own.  Hence, they need to enlist and train a relatively 
large number of “willing executioners,” which in turn requires social settings (communities) 
                                                          
1
 Evolutionary game theory models that encompass conflict and cooperation can be found in most game theory 
textbooks as well as in textbooks in biology that contain mathematical methods (e.g., Harrington 2008, Dixit et al. 
2013, and Nowak 2006).  Most evolutionary games in such textbooks assume that agents are genetically predisposed 
to display certain traits and that various traits are favored or disfavored over time and correspondingly increase or 
decrease in the population over many generations.  Applications of evolutionary methods in the specific contexts of 
terrorism and genocide with a focus on social evolution are relatively scarce in the defense and peace economics 
literature.  Two important social evolutionary contributions in the terrorism literature, however, are Arce and 
Sandler  (2003, 2009), who model dynamic social interactions between fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists 
within a population.  Arce and Sandler identify conditions within the models in which non-fundamentalists fake the 
fundamentalist phenotype in order to do well within a fundamentalist-dominated group.  The models also reveal 
conditions in which non-fundamentalists who are unable or unwilling to fake the fundamentalist trait can be weeded 
out of the population.  Citation here uses evolutionary game theory to model the social evolution of phenotypes 
within a village that could either support or resist the aims of genocidal architects.  He identifies conditions in which 
the social evolution between hardliners, bystanders, and resisters tilts in favor of genocide resistance, but also 
conditions in which the village socially evolves to support the aims of the genocide architects.  This article extends 
citation here’s work by considering a wider range of parameter possibilities in the space-less model (but with only 
two rather than three phenotypes) and by evaluating the implications of social evolution across geographic space.    
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wherein such recruitment and training can succeed (Goldhagen 1996).  The focus of the model 
that follows is upon such social environments.  Using evolutionary game theory, we model the 
conditions that give rise to atrocity-supporting social environments and how the entrepreneurs of 
violence can attempt to “socially engineer” such communities.  
2.1. Stage Game and Fitness Equations 
Imagine a village of 10,000 people.  Assume an authority group seeks to perpetrate atrocity 
against an out-group and would like the village to be supportive of its aggressive aims.  Assume 
the potentially targeted out-group encompasses people who are not part of the 10,000 in the 
village.  Some villagers may already have a latent desire for aggression against the out-group; 
say there are 1,000 such people (10 percent).  Assume the other 9,000 (90 percent) would resist 
aggression against the out-group under current social conditions.  As the village is characterized 
now, it would not be useful to the atrocity architects in perpetrating aggression against an out-
group.  But can the authority group engineer a social metamorphosis of the village such that it 
becomes supportive of or not resistant to their aims?  Can the turning be accomplished relatively 
easily?  Under certain conditions to be identified, the answer to each question is “yes.”  
Assume each person in the village has one of two dispositions toward people from the 
out-group: peaceful (P) and aggressive (A).  The villagers are not genetically hardwired to one 
disposition or the other; people have free will, so each is free to choose the trait that s/he prefers.  
Humans are social creatures, so there is a lot of interaction among the people in the village day-
by-day.  People work with others, buy and sell in the marketplace with others, attend charitable 
causes and political rallies with others, and recreate with others (e.g., sporting events, picnics, 
etc.).  Assume the game matrix in Figure 1 represents the payoffs to two individuals, Bob (the 
row player) and Sally (the column player), who interact in the village.  Assume that Bob and 
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Sally each choose the aggressive trait (A) and they socially interact over coffee.  Based on Figure 
1, their interaction leads to payoff a for each person.  If both display the peaceful (P) trait, each 
would receive payoff d from their encounter.  If Bob is peaceful and Sally aggressive, Bob would 
receive c and Sally b as shown in the lower left cell of the matrix.  The obverse interaction is 
shown in the upper right cell in which Bob receives b and Sally c.   
Figure 1 here 
In evolutionary game theory, Figure 1 is the “stage game.”  It is the matrix that governs 
the payoffs to individuals in all pairwise social interactions in the village.  The payoffs reflect the 
history, culture, language, and interpersonal norms of people in the village.  Although highly 
simplified, the matrix in Figure 1 is a type of “social genome” for the village.  Other villages will 
have different social genomes and more complex genomes can be represented by more complex 
stage games.  Our village’s genome will determine its traits or phenotypes, i.e., the number of 
people that are aggressive (A) and peaceful (P) toward an out-group.  Moreover, the atrocity 
entrepreneurs can attempt to engineer the traits of people in the village so that a greater number 
adopt aggressiveness.  In short, the social genome is amenable to manipulation.   
In social evolutionary terms, the traits of people – peaceful (P) and aggressive (A) – can 
be thought of as strategies that they display in their social interactions with others.  Assume for 
simplicity that people cannot play a mixed strategy in which they choose P or A with a random 
device.  Assume two people are randomly drawn from the village and paired with one another.  
The pairing represents a social encounter in the village and the payoff to each individual in the 
pair is governed by Figure 1.  Many such social encounters occur in the village throughout the 
day and we can construct the expected payoff for each strategy from such an encounter.  Let N 
represent the number of people in the village (say N=10,000) and nA the number who initially 
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choose the aggressive trait (say nA=1,000).  It follows that the number of people in the village 
initially choosing peacefulness, nP, is equal to N-nA (nP=9,000).  Given these initial conditions 
and assuming an individual can be randomly paired with itself (self-play), the probability that a 
randomly drawn individual from the village would be paired with an aggressive type is (   ⁄ ) 
and with a peaceful type is [(    )  ⁄ ]  (   ⁄ ).
2
   
Based on Figure 1 and our foregoing assumptions, the expected payoff to a villager who 
adopts the aggressive strategy, FA, in a random pairwise social encounter is: 
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)   (
    
 
)   (  )   (    ) ,    (1) 
where rA is the ratio of the number of A-types to the total number in the village (      ⁄ ).  
The expected payoff to a villager adopting peace, FP, in a random pairwise social encounter is: 
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In evolutionary game theory, FA and FP are the respective “fitness” of the A and P traits in the 
village.  If aggressiveness is rewarded through, say, advancement in the atrocity leaders 
organization, self-preservation, family preservation, or loot, then the A trait would be relatively 
fit.  If, however, aggressiveness is shunned and the peaceful trait is held in high esteem, then the 
P strategy would be relatively fit.  Equations (1) and (2) show that each strategy’s fitness 
depends on the proportion of the villagers playing each strategy and the payoffs generated from 
the various pair-wise social encounters.  The average fitness in the village,  ̅, is: 
 ̅    (
  
 
)    (
    
 
)    (  )    (    ) ,    (3) 
where Fi (i=A, P) are given in equations (1) and (2).   
                                                          
2
 Self-play is an assumption that simplifies the probability calculations for random draws without substantially 
affecting results.  Specifically, without self-play, the probability that an A-type individual would be paired in a 
random draw with another A-type is [(    ) (   )⁄ ] and with a P-type [(    ) (   )⁄ ].  Self-play allows 
us to treat these probabilities as (   ⁄ ) and [(    )  ⁄ ], respectively. 
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2.2. Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)  
In social environments, humans look around and learn from the behavior of others.  They 
observe which traits are rewarded and which are penalized and they tend to choose or mimic 
traits that are successful.  In certain atrocity contexts, people who refuse to support aggression 
toward an out-group (and thus adopt peacefulness in our model) can be subject to dire penalties 
including incarceration or execution.  In this way, such people are “weeded out.”3  Others may 
act “as if” they support aggression to save their lives or careers or the lives of family members 
and friends.  In our model we treat such people as adopting the aggressive trait.
4
  It is important 
to keep in mind in the analyses that follow that the fitness of traits, specifically, the incentives 
people have to adopt fitter traits and shun less fit traits, drives social evolution in the village.   
The replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory are equations that describe how 
fitter strategies are adopted and less fit strategies fall out of favor over time.  Following Nowak 
(2006), the replicator dynamic in the village is governed by the following difference equation: 
   
      
    
 (    ̅)   ,        (4) 
where   
 
 is the number of A-types in the village at time j (j=t+1, t) and FA and  ̅ are given by 
equations (1) and (3), respectively.  We could present the replicator equation for nP, but since 
nP=N-nA and N is fixed, equation (4) also describes changes in nP over time.  Note in equation (4) 
that if     ̅, aggression (A) will be fitter than average and thus fitter than peacefulness (P).  As 
such, the number of people adopting aggression will rise over time and the number displaying 
peacefulness will decline.  It is this dynamic the atrocity entrepreneurs wish to generate.  To 
                                                          
3
 In this article we do not model the weeding out of resisters from the population.  
 
4
 A model with more than two phenotypes could treat feigning aggressiveness as a third phenotype as in Arce and 
Sandler (2009).  In order to compare and contrast our space-less analyses in this section with social evolution over 
geographic space in the next section, we assume two phenotypes. 
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complete the replicator dynamics, let the initial number of villagers adopting aggression be   
  
and peacefulness   
 .  In the numerical example earlier,   
 =1,000 and   
 =9,000. 
 Based on the payoff values a, b, c, and d in the stage game in Figure 1 and assuming no 
payoff ties for a and c as well as for b and d, there are four possible cases in which the ratio of 
aggressive types, rA, is determined as summarized in Table 1 (Nowak 2006, p. 50).
5
  In Case 1, 
the payoffs to aggressive types are low relative to the corresponding payoffs to peaceful types: 
a<c and b<d.  Case 1 depicts a simplified “social genome” in which the village’s history, culture, 
religion and so forth imply that aggressiveness is unrewarded relative to peacefulness in pairwise 
social encounters.  For Case 2, a<c and b>d.  Now the payoff for an aggressive type in a “cross 
encounter” with a peaceful type is more rewarding to the aggressor relative to what s/he would 
have achieved had s/he been peaceful (b>d).  In Case 3, a>c and b<d.  Relative to Case 1, the 
payoff to an aggressive type in a “same encounter” with an aggressive type is more rewarding to 
the aggressor relative to what s/he would have achieved had s/he been peaceful (a>c).  Finally, 
in Case 4, a>c and b>d.  Here the “social genome” implies that the aggressive trait is rewarded 
relative to peacefulness in pairwise encounters.  Such a society would be one in which 
compliance with the atrocity entrepreneurs would lead to survival, career advancement, and/or 
material rewards while non-compliance would correspond to the absence of such benefits. 
Table 1 here  
 Figure 2 shows four social evolutionary outcomes that can arise in the model based on 
the four cases in Table 1.  Each panel plots the fitness equations (1) and (2) over the ratio 
adopting the aggressive strategy, rA, under the parameter assumptions of the four cases.
6
  For 
                                                          
5
 No payoff ties for a and c and for b and d eliminates special cases that are not essential to the article’s main points. 
 
6
 Figure 2 and the simulations in this article assume that parameter values are not negative, but this is not necessary.  
For example, if peaceful types are harmed in interactions with aggressive types, c would be negative.   
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Case 1 (a<c and b<d) the upper left panel of Figure 2 shows that peace is fitter than aggression 
(FP>FA) for any possible ratio of the population adopting aggression.  By equations (3) and (4), 
any temporarily present aggressive types will be less fit than peaceful types, leading to a decline 
in the number and ratio of individuals displaying aggression.  In Case 1, the equilibrium outcome 
is   
    as shown in the top left panel of Figure 2, which is an evolutionary stable strategy 
(ESS) because any mutation toward aggression by some in the village will remain less fit than 
peacefulness.  Moreover, if the atrocity entrepreneurs sent aggressive types into the village from 
the outside in an effort to turn the villagers toward aggression, such an invasion would be 
ineffective in turning the villagers to aggression given the payoff parameter assumptions of Case 
1.
7
  In Case 1, peace dominates and the village cannot be turned. 
 When moving from Case 1 to 2 in Figure 2 (see lower left panel), we increase b and/or 
decrease d.  In Figure 1, such parameter changes represent higher payoffs for A-types in cross 
encounters and/or lower payoffs for P-types in same encounters, which tilts the outcome away 
from the dominance of peace in Case 1 to coexistence of peaceful and aggressive types in Case 
2.  We now have equalized fitness (expected payoffs) at   
  (   ) (       )⁄  in the 
lower left panel, which is an ESS because any temporary change in rA above or below   
  leads to 
aggression being less or more fit than peace, causing rA  to move back toward   
 .  Moreover, if 
the atrocity entrepreneurs send aggressive types into the village from the outside in an effort to 
turn it toward aggression, this would temporarily increase rA, but it would not increase   
 .  Thus, 
such a policy would not alter the coexistence outcome given the parameter values of Case 2. 
When moving from Case 1 to 3 in Figure 2 (see upper right panel), we increase a and/or 
decrease c.  In Figure 1, such parameter changes represent an increase in payoffs for A-types in 
                                                          
7
 The invasion of aggressors would increase the number and ratio of aggressive types,   
  and   
 , and increase the 
village’s population, N. 
9 
 
same encounters and/or a decrease in payoffs for P-types in cross encounters.  This tilts the 
outcome away from the dominance of peace in Case 1 to a bi-stable situation in Case 3.  We now 
have equalized fitness (expected payoffs) at   
         (   ) (       )⁄  in the upper 
right panel.  Such an outcome is not an ESS because any temporary increase in rA above or 
below   
         would lead to aggression being more or less fit than peacefulness, causing a 
change in rA toward an extreme outcome.  Specifically, if there is a sufficiently large number and 
thus ratio of aggressive types in the population such that      
        , then aggression will be 
fitter than peacefulness and rA will grow toward   
   , which is an ESS.  Alternatively, if the 
village contains enough peaceful types such that      
        , then peacefulness will be fitter 
than aggression and rA will decline toward   
   , which is also an ESS.  Case 3 shows that the 
initial ratio of aggressive types is critically important in determining whether the village’s social 
evolution is toward atrocity-supporting aggression or atrocity-resisting peace.  If the initial ratio 
rA is just below   
        , social evolution will increasingly reward the peaceful trait (as more 
villagers adopt peacefulness) until only peacefulness is displayed in the village (  
   ).  But 
suppose from the starting point in which   
  is just below   
         the atrocity entrepreneurs bring 
in a small number of aggressive types from the outside such that the initial rA is just above 
  
        .  Now social evolution will increasingly reward the aggressive trait over time until the 
whole village displays aggressiveness (  
   ).  Case 3 shows that when the initial proportion rA 
is close to   
        , a small invasion of aggressive types promoted by the atrocity entrepreneurs 
can have a dramatic effect in tipping the village away from what would have been the social 
evolution of peace to the social evolution of aggression.  The Case 3 village can be turned. 
When moving from Case 1 to Case 4 in Figure 2 (see lower right panel), we increase a 
and/or decrease c and increase b and/or decrease d.  In reference to Figure 1, each of these 
10 
 
parameter changes favors the fitness of aggressive relative to peaceful phenotypes.  For Case 4 
we see in the lower right panel that aggression is fitter than peace (FA>FP) for any possible ratio 
of the population adopting the aggressive trait.  By equations (3) and (4), any temporarily present 
peaceful types will be less fit than aggressive types, thus leading to a decline in the number and 
ratio of individuals displaying the peaceful trait.  In Case 4, the equilibrium outcome is   
   , 
which is an ESS.  Note also that there is no need for the atrocity entrepreneurs to send aggressive 
types into the village to foster the social evolution of aggression because the village is already 
(and persistently) turned.  In Case 4, aggression dominates peace. 
Figure 2 here 
2.3. A Numerical Example: Engineering the Social Evolution of Aggression 
As a numerical example of how an atrocity entrepreneur can engineer a social outcome that 
supports aggression against an out-group, assume parameter values consistent with a Case 3 bi-
stable outcome: a=2, b=1.5, c=1, d=2, and   
       (20 percent).  Panel (a) of Figure 3 plots 
the fitness equations (1) and (2) for these parameters and shows that   
             .  Since 
  
    
        , peacefulness is more rewarding (fitter) than aggressiveness, leading more people 
to choose peacefulness over time according to replicator equation (4).  Hence, rA declines over 
time in panel (a) until arriving at the ESS in which all villagers adopt peacefulness (  
   ).   
Suppose from the panel (a) starting point of   
       in Figure 3, the atrocity 
entrepreneurs insert enough aggressive types from the outside that   
  rises to 0.25.  Such a 
policy alone is insufficient to turn the social evolution away from peace because   
       is 
less than   
             .  But suppose the invasion is coupled with policies that increase 
payoffs in aggressive/aggressive encounters and reduce payoffs in peaceful/peaceful encounters.  
Specifically, assume a rises from 2 to 2.2 and d falls from 2 to 1.8.  As shown in panel (b) of 
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Figure 3, the relatively small changes in a and d (10 percent each) cause   
         to fall to 0.20.  
Coupled with the relatively small increase in   
  to 0.25 from the invasion,   
  is now greater than 
  
        .  Hence, in panel (b), the aggressive trait is more rewarding (fitter) than peacefulness, 
leading more people to choose aggressiveness over time according to replicator equation (4).  As 
such, rA increases over time in panel (b) until arriving at the ESS in which all villagers are 
aggressive types (  
   ).  
Figure 3 here 
2.4. The Nazi Example: Engineering the Social Evolution of Aggression in Occupied Europe  
 
The payoffs a, b, c, and d in the stage game in Figure 1 are the outcomes from social interactions 
in the village, which are rooted in the village’s history, customs, and institutions.  The payoffs 
can be thought of as the village’s genomic endowment or heritage.  We do not model the origins 
of the payoffs, but take them as given.  In villages influenced or controlled by terrorist groups 
and genocide architects, the social genome is subject to “social engineering” in which the 
violence entrepreneurs attempt to foster a social metamorphosis to aggression.  Our previous 
analyses, summarized in Table 1 and Figure 2, show that increases in a and b and decreases in c 
and d move the village from Case 1 in which peace dominates toward Case 4 in which 
aggression dominates.  In moving toward Case 4, the intermediate Case 3 (with high a and low 
c) could also be amenable to the social evolution of aggression provided a sufficiently large 
invasion of aggressors came into the village (see Figure 3).  Hence, the violence entrepreneurs 
would like to increase a and b, decrease c and d, and/or insert an outside gang of aggressors into 
the village.  What do these constructs represent in a real-world setting of potential social 
evolution of aggression?  We address this question by presenting selected social evolutionary 
techniques deployed by the Nazis in the occupied territories of Europe during World War II.   
12 
 
 In the foundational book in the field of genocide studies, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 
Raphael Lemkin (1944, p. xi and 79) described genocide as a “synchronized attack” designed to 
destroy the existence of a victim group and replace it with the national pattern of the oppressor.  
Lemkin (1944, pp. xiii-xiv) identified eight dimensions or “fields” of group destruction:   
[I]n the political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing 
a German pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in the 
social field (by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or 
removing elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide spiritual 
leadership…); in the cultural field (by prohibiting or destroying cultural 
institutions and cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for 
education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking…); in the 
economic field (by shifting wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of 
trades and occupations by people who do not promote Germanism “without 
reservations”); in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by 
promoting procreation by Germans in occupied countries); in the field of physical 
existence (by introducing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by 
mass killings, mainly Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in the religious field 
(by interfering with the activities of the Church, which in many countries provides 
not only spiritual but national leadership); in the field of morality (by attempts to 
create an atmosphere of moral debasement through promoting pornographic 
publications and motion pictures, and the excessive consumption of alcohol). 
What occurred in each of these eight fields was a social advancement of people who supported or 
did not resist the Nazi Program and a social degradation of those who did resist.  In the context 
13 
 
of the simplified social genome in Figure 1, the Nazis implemented policies that increased 
payoffs to supporters of aggression when aggressive phenotypes interacted (increase a) and 
aggressive and peaceful types interacted (increase b).  On the flip side, peaceful types were 
harmed through policies that decreased payoffs to supporters of peace when peaceful and 
aggressive types interacted (decrease c) and peaceful types interacted (decrease d).  Furthermore, 
the Nazis implemented invasions of aggressive types into locales to foster the social evolution of 
aggression.  Table 2 presents selected Nazi techniques that promoted the social evolution of 
aggression categorized according to the parameters of the evolutionary game model. 
Table 2 here 
3. The Social Evolution of Aggression Over Geographic Space 
In this section we extend the evolutionary game model of section 2 into geographic space.  
Specifically, we model how the social evolution of aggression plays out over time and over a 
village’s area.  The introduction of geographic space into the analysis shows, among other 
things, that atrocity entrepreneurs can use geography to accomplish their objectives even under 
conditions that are not generally supportive of the social evolution of aggression.   
3.1. Payoffs from Social Encounters in a Moore Neighborhood 
Following Nowak (2006, Ch. 9), assume each individual in the village is situated on a two-
dimensional square lattice in which it socially interacts with each of its immediate neighbors.  In 
each time period, each individual receives a payoff based on its interactions with the various 
neighbors.  Moreover, each individual observes the payoffs accruing to each neighbor and then 
adopts in the next period the trait or strategy yielding the highest payoff in the neighborhood.  
Figure 4 is an example of such characteristics and is known as a Moore neighborhood.  In panel 
(a) of Figure 4, assume Sally (in the middle of the lattice) initially selects the peacefulness trait 
14 
 
(P) and her eight immediate neighbors in the lattice also choose peacefulness.  According to the 
stage game in Figure 1, the payoff to a peaceful individual in a social encounter with another 
peaceful type is d.  In panel (a) of Figure 4, Sally socially interacts with eight peaceful types in 
her neighborhood, so she receives a payoff of 8d.  Assuming that there is not a higher payoff 
than 8d in Sally’s neighborhood, she will choose peacefulness in the next period, otherwise she 
will switch to the aggressive trait.  Panel (b) of Figure 4 presents a different situation for Sally.  
Notice that she is now surrounded by five aggressive and three peaceful neighbors.  Based on the 
stage game of Figure 1, Sally receives a payoff of c from each of the five encounters with an 
aggressive neighbor and d from each of the three encounters with a peaceful neighbor.  Hence, 
her payoff from the eight encounters in panel (b) is 5c+3d.  If we are in a case in which c and d 
are low relative to a and b, respectively, then some of Sally’s aggressive-displaying neighbors 
will have a greater payoff than Sally.  In the next round, Sally will have an incentive to switch to 
the aggressive trait (perhaps for sake of self-preservation, career advancement, etc.).
8
 
Figure 4 here 
3.2. Social Evolution of Aggression in a Moore Neighborhood 
Here we present several dynamic and spatial simulations of the social evolution of aggression to 
demonstrate how an atrocity entrepreneur can engineer outcomes that promote the social 
acceptance of aggression toward an out-group.  We begin with parameter values that align with 
Case 2 in Table 1 and Figure 2 (i.e., a<c and b>d) analyzed earlier in which there was a 
coexistence outcome.  Although we tether the spatial model here to parameters associated with 
the space-less model of section 2, Moore neighborhood social encounters and payoff generations 
                                                          
8
 Although the boundaries of the lattices in Figure 4 would appear to imply that individuals on the edges do not have 
eight neighbors, simulations of spatial evolution in a Moore neighborhood can wrap such edges around the square to 
generate a torus.  Toroidal geometry implies that each cell in the grid is equivalent to each other cell and each 
individual has eight neighbors (Nowak 2006, p. 148). 
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are not the same as the random pairwise encounters of the space-less model.  Hence, the results 
of the space-less and Moore neighborhood models will differ. 
Assume a=1, c=2, b=1.5, and d=1 in the stage game of Figure 1 and the initial proportion 
of aggressors is   
      .  Assume the village is made up of 10,000 people (N=10,000).  Based 
on simulation techniques available from EvoLudo, panel (a) of Figure 5 shows a 100x100 square 
lattice in which 20 percent of the village’s inhabitants are initially aggressive types (shown by 
the red cells) and 80 percent are peaceful types (shown by the blue cells) (see evoludo.org
 
).  The 
initial distribution of types is randomly assigned across space by EvoLudo.  Panel (b) of Figure 5 
shows the period 25 result of the social evolution of phenotypes in the Moore village.  The blue 
cells represent peaceful types who were peaceful in the previous period and the red cells 
aggressive types who were aggressive in the previous period.  The green cells show peaceful 
types who were aggressive in the previous period.  The yellow cells show aggressive types who 
were peaceful in the previous period.  Figure 5 shows the social evolution to a coexistence 
outcome in which the proportion of people adopting the aggressive trait will oscillate between 
about 27 and 41 percent even out to thousands of periods.  Particular individuals in the village 
will switch their strategies over time, depending on relative fitness in sub-neighborhoods, but the 
proportionate outcome remains in the range of about 27 to 41 percent aggressiveness.  
Figure 5 here 
 Assume now that a=2, c=1, b=1, and d=2 in the stage game of Figure 1 and the initial 
proportion of aggressors is   
      .  These parameter values correspond to Case 3 in Table 1 
and Figure 2 in the space-less model in which there was a bi-stable outcome.  Panel (a) of the 
previous figure (Figure 5) represents EvoLudo’s random distribution of the initial 20 percent 
aggressive types in the village.  Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows a quick social evolution to peace in 
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the village by period 2 under our new parameters (  
   ).  From panel (a), assume the atrocity 
entrepreneurs are able to increase the payoff in aggressive/aggressive encounters by 25 percent 
from a=2 to a=2.5.  Panel (b) shows the implications of the parameter change in the village at 
period 75.  Permanent blocks (sub-neighborhoods) of aggressive types emerge in the village 
encompassing about 2.8 percent of the population.  This may seem relatively benign, but the 
village is close to a tipping point in which it could evolve to complete aggression.  In panel (c) of 
Figure 6, we go back to the initial conditions of c=1, b=1, d=2, and   
      , but we increase 
parameter a just a bit more to 2.7.  By period 10, aggression has seriously metastasized in the 
village.  By period 23, the village has socially evolved to complete aggression (not shown).
9
   
 Manipulating a is not the only social genomic tool available to atrocity entrepreneurs; 
parameters b, c, and d can also be manipulated.  Assume now that a is back to the value of 2.5 in 
which blocks of aggressive types occur for 2.8 percent of the population as in panel (b) of Figure 
6.  Let b increase by 20 percent from 1 to 1.2 and c fall by 20 percent from 1 to 0.8.  Parameter b 
is the payoff to an aggressive type in a cross encounter with a peaceful type and c is the payoff to 
a peaceful type in a cross encounter with an aggressive type.  These parameter changes tilt the 
game in favor of aggressors and against peaceful types in cross encounters, everything else the 
same.  Begin from EvoLudo’s random distribution of the initial 20 percent aggressive types in 
the village, such as panel (a) in Figure 5 above.  In panel (d) of Figure 6, numerous 
concentrations of aggressive types socially evolve by period 5.  By period 18, the whole village 
socially evolves to the aggressive phenotype such that   
    (not shown).  Figure 6 shows how 
relatively easy it is for atrocity entrepreneurs to put the village on the path toward the social 
evolution of complete aggression.  All that was required was a 35 percent favorable change in 
                                                          
9
 The time period of convergence and, for some parameter sets, the proportion of phenotypes that persist over time, 
depend on EvoLudo’s random spatial distribution of initial phenotypes. 
17 
 
payoffs to aggressive types in same encounters (increase a from 2 to 2.7) or a 25 percent 
favorable change in same encounters (increase a from 2 to 2.5) coupled with a 20 percent 
favorable change in cross encounters (increase b from 1 to 1.2 and decrease c from 1 to 0.8). 
Figure 6 here 
3.3. Payoffs from Social Encounters in a von Neumann Neighborhood  
In a von Neumann neighborhood, each player interacts with its four nearest neighbors to the 
north, south, east, and west and does not interact with its diagonal neighbors.  In panel (a) of 
Figure 4 above, Sally would only interact with neighbors 2, 4, 6, and 8 in a von Neumann 
neighborhood and thus receive a payoff of 4d.  In panel (b) of Figure 4, Sally’s von Neumann 
neighborhood payoff would be 2c+2d.  Just like the Moore neighborhood, we assume here that 
each individual observes the payoffs accruing to each neighbor and then adopts in the next 
period the trait yielding the highest payoff in the neighborhood. 
3.4. Social Evolution of Aggression in a von Neumann Neighborhood 
Social evolutionary behaviors in von Neumann relative to Moore neighborhoods can be quite 
different as demonstrated in Figure 7.  In panel (a) we have a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2, and   
       
and EvoLudo randomly distributes the 20 percent red cells across the population such as shown 
earlier in panel (a) of Figure 5.  Recall that for these parameter values in a Moore neighborhood, 
social evolution quickly converged to complete peacefulness by period 2 (see panel (a) of Figure 
6).  For the von Neumann neighborhood, however, pockets of aggressors persist in the village 
encompassing about 2.1 percent of the population by period 10 as shown in panel (a) of Figure 7.  
Even out to thousands of periods, blocks of aggressive types persist in the von Neumann 
neighborhood (not shown).  Generally, von Neumann geography is more beneficial to aggressive 
types than Moore geography for equivalent parameter values.  For example, in panel (b) of 
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Figure 7 we show the social evolution in a Moore village assuming a=2.4, b=1.2, c=0.8, d=2, and 
  
      .  As panel (b) shows, blocks of aggressive types persist in the Moore village even out 
to time period 1,000.  In the less dense interactions of a von Neumann relative to a Moore 
neighborhood (4 neighbors rather than 8), however, the same parameter values that converged to 
a few isolated blocks of aggressive types in the Moore village socially evolves toward complete 
aggression in the von Neumann village as shown in panel (c).  Shown in that panel is the social 
evolution of aggression at period 100.  By period 115, the social evolution is complete and the 
whole village is made up of aggressive phenotypes (not shown).
10
 
 Atrocity entrepreneurs can also engineer sub-neighborhoods of aggressors as shown in 
panel (d) of Figure 7 assuming a von Neumann village.  In that panel we return to the parameter 
values a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2, and   
      .  By period 10, persistent blocks of aggressors 
surrounded by much larger groups of peaceful types emerge (not shown).  In the upper left 
corner of panel (d), we “artificially inseminate” the village with 25 additional aggressors in a 
concentrated block in a sub-neighborhood of the village.  Panel (d) of Figure 7 shows the results 
at period 50.  The artificially created block of aggressive types persists, as do all other aggressive 
blocks, even though the overall village strongly tilts toward peacefulness.  Panel (d) implies that 
if a particular sub-neighborhood is especially valuable to the atrocity entrepreneurs for achieving 
their objectives, they can create local “success” given von Neumann relative to Moore geography 
even when the overall social evolution favors peacefulness. 
Figure 7 here 
                                                          
10
 In footnote 9 we noted that the outcome of a simulation can be sensitive to EvoLudo’s initial random spatial 
distribution of phenotypes.  In ten Moore simulations with the parameter values of panel (b) of Figure 7, all 
converged to the presence of blocks of aggressive types surrounded by mostly peaceful types as shown in panel (b).  
For ten von Neumann simulations using the parameters of panel (c) of Figure 7, nine converged to complete 
aggression and one converged to the presence of large blocks of aggressive types (much larger than in panel b for 
the Moore village).  Overall, the von Neumann village is more prone than the Moore village to the survivability and 
spread of aggressive types for the simulations that we ran, everything else the same. 
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4. Policy Interventions and the Social Evolution of Peace  
At the most basic level, third-party interveners for peace seek to socially engineer the opposite 
outcome in a village relative to the aims of the atrocity entrepreneurs.  In the space-less model in 
section 3, peace supporters would like a village’s “social DNA” to be such that the peaceful trait 
is rewarded and aggressiveness is unrewarded in pairwise encounters.  Hence, if parameters a 
and b are relatively low and c and d relatively high, Case 1 emerges in Figure 2 such that peace 
dominates everywhere in the village.  For less sanguine parameter values, for example those 
corresponding to the Case 3 bi-stable outcome in Figure 2, the initial number of peaceful types in 
the village can be critically important in insuring that peace rather than aggression socially 
evolves in the village.  Hence, insertion of peacekeepers can be decisive in insuring peace under 
certain conditions.  When considering geographic space in evolutionary dynamics, additional 
issues come to the fore for peacekeeping consideration, to which we now turn.   
4.1. Policy Interventions for Peace in a Moore Neighborhood 
Assume a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2, and   
       in a Moore village.  Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows a 
metastasizing lump of aggressive types by period 3.  Left unchecked the lump will grow until the 
whole village is of the aggressive type (not shown).  In panel (b), we insert 15 peacekeepers into 
the center of the lump.  Panel (c) shows that the peacekeeping effort is too little too late.  By 
period 15, the lump has aggressively metastasized and, left unchecked, will evolve until the 
whole village is aggressive (not shown).  Panel (d) shows at period 3 a lump that is the same size 
as that shown in panel (c).  Similar to the lump in panel (a), insertion of 15 peacekeepers will be 
insufficient to stem the growth of aggression (not shown).  Hence, we insert 20 peacekeepers 
into the lump as shown in panel (e).  Panel (f) shows that by period 4 aggression is contained and 
the village is made up of only peaceful types.  What is striking about Figure 8 is how the fate of 
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the village can hang on a “knife edge.”  With 20 rather than 15 peacekeepers, complete 
peacefulness is sustained in the village rather than the emergence of complete aggression.         
Figure 8 here 
 Following Nowak (2006, pp. 159-160), we consider the role of “walkers” in creating a 
“big bang” of peace.  A walker is a concentrated unit of 10 peaceful types that operates in a 
world of aggressive types (Nowak 2006, p. 159).  In panel (a) of Figure 9, two walker teams are 
inserted at time 0 into the otherwise completely aggressive Moore village under parameter 
assumptions that favor peaceful types in same encounters (d=1), aggressive types even more in 
cross encounters (b=1.51), but otherwise are not favorable (a=0, c=0).  The village’s population 
is N=4,761, so the 20 peacekeepers imply   
       .11  In 100 simulations not presented in this 
article in which the initial proportion of aggressors was 90 percent and they were randomly 
distributed in the village, social evolution always converged to complete aggression.  But the 
“walker intervention policy” in panel (a) leads to a decidedly different outcome.  By time 6 the 
walker teams are close to connecting as shown in panel (b).  Panel (c) shows the early stage of a 
“big bang” of peace in period 8.  By time 15, the social evolution of peace continues to grow (see 
panel d).  Panel (e) shows that by time 60, peace has become dominant in the village and by time 
150, pockets of aggressive types are relatively small and contained as shown in panel (f).   
Figure 9 here 
4.2. Policy Interventions for Peace in a von Neumann Neighborhood 
A von Neumann village is less concentrated than a Moore village in that each individual interacts 
with four neighbors rather than eight.  We ran the same simulations here as in the previous sub-
section to compare and contrast policy interventions for peace under the two geographies.    
                                                          
11
 N=4,761 was Nowak’s (2006) assumption in his walker analysis, which we follow here. 
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 Assume as above in Figure 8 that a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2, and   
      , but now we are 
in a von Neumann village.  In panel (a) of Figure 10, we show the emergence of persistent blocks 
of aggressive types by period 3.  These aggressive blocks will persist out to thousands of periods 
(not shown).  In panel (b), we insert one peacekeeper into the center of each of the 41 aggressive 
blocks.  Panel (c) shows that the peacekeeping effort is effective for those blocks that had five or 
fewer aggressive types, but ineffective for blocks that had six or more aggressors.  Panel (d) of 
Figure 10 shows at time 3 the insertion of one peacekeeper into aggressive blocks of five or 
fewer and two peacekeepers into aggressive blocks of six or more.  By time 4, the whole village 
socially evolves to peace (not shown).  The spatial dynamics of peacekeeping in Moore relative 
to von Neumann neighborhoods differ.  In Moore neighborhoods, concentrations of aggressive 
types can begin to socially evolve and peacekeeping efforts must be sufficiently concentrated 
and substantial if aggression is to be neutralized.  In von Neumann geography, however, many 
scattered locales of aggressive types can persist, even under parametric conditions that overall 
are supportive of peacefulness.  Under such conditions, peacekeeping efforts must be sufficiently 
disparate (geographically) and substantial per locale for the aggressive lumps to be eradicated. 
Figure 10 here 
 Figure 11 shows that walker peacekeeping efforts differ under von Neumann relative to 
Moore geography.  In panel (a), two peaceful teams of ten are inserted at time 0 into the 
otherwise completely aggressive von Neumann village under the same parameter values as in the 
Moore village analyzed in Figure 9 (i.e., a=0, b=1.51, c=0, d=1, and   
       ).  The walker 
intervention policy shown in panel (a) of Figure 11 is the same as that shown in panel (a) of 
Figure 9, but under von Neumann geography the results are decidedly different.  By time 6, the 
walker teams are close to connecting as shown in panel (b) of Figure 11.  Panel (c) shows by 
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time 12 the emergence of, not a big bang of peace, but a “small band” of peace.  Running the 
simulation forward from panel (c)’s time 12 leads to no further changes.  Hence, von Neumann 
geography is not conducive to a big bang of peace the way Moore geography is.  Moreover, the 
big bang of peace under Moore geography required two concentrating teams of walkers.  Under 
von Neumann geography, however, each walker team has the capability of carving out its own 
small band of peace as shown in panels (d)-(f) of Figure 11.  In panel (d), we set the initial teams 
of walkers such that they will not connect.  By period 25, each team is carving out its own small 
band of peace.  By about period 75, the creations of the small bands of peace have come to an 
end, but much of the village remains of the aggressive phenotype.  
Figure 11 here 
5. Conclusions 
People groups are amenable to forms of social genomic engineering in which their interpersonal 
interactions, perceptions of culture and history, and population mixes are manipulated to support 
the aims of a small group of “social engineers.”  In this article, the social engineers are the 
leaders of terrorist organizations or genocide architects, who seek to socially transform people 
groups away from peacefulness to an aggressive posture toward out-groups.  Using evolutionary 
game theory models, we analyzed population mixes and how people relate or misrelate to others 
in space-less pairwise encounters and in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods to highlight 
conditions under which atrocity engineers can transform a village into supporting, or not 
resisting, violence against an out-group.  We also analyzed conditions under which peacemakers 
could prevent the social evolution of aggression.  
Future research on modeling the social evolution of aggression should consider that much 
of the vast array of mathematical machinery in evolutionary biology has yet to be adapted to the 
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study of the social evolution of aggression and peace.  Many other neighborhood assumptions 
beyond von Neumann and Moore can be considered.  For example, individuals in a village could 
be treated as triangular (having three direct neighbors) or pentagonal (having five direct 
neighbors) and so forth such that a wide range of population densities could be modeled (three, 
four, five, six direct neighbors, etc.).  EvoLudo’s simulation techniques already allow very dense 
neighborhoods of 24, 48, 80, and even higher levels, with results that can vary significantly from 
the von Neumann (4 neighbors) and Moore (8 neighbors) geographies.  Furthermore, in this 
article we used “best wins equal stay” player updates and synchronous population updates.  
Numerous other player and population update protocols are available in the evolutionary 
literature including, for players, “best wins equal random,” “best reply,” and “Fermi update,” and 
for populations, “asynchronous replication,” “birth death processes,” and “stochastic updates.”12  
Moreover, there are alternative methods for modeling replicator dynamics including alternative 
replicator equations, variations in the degree to which payoffs translate into fitness, potential for 
sub-groups of the population to only interact with those they desire, migrations into and out of 
the population (e.g., births, deaths, refugees), and stochastic elements.  In addition, modeling the 
spatial social evolution of aggression and peace can consider three (or more) phenotypes such as 
fundamentalists, non-fundamentalists, and feigners (as in Arce and Sandler 2009) or hardliners, 
bystanders, and resisters (as in citation here).  Potentially important geographic elements such as 
forests, mountain ranges, borders, waterways, and population density variations in sub-
neighborhoods could also be incorporated into such models.     
The key messages of our article are several.  First, under a fairly wide range of 
conditions, people groups can socially exist near a “knife edge” in which small social 
engineering efforts toward aggression or peace can have dramatic effects.  We saw in several 
                                                          
12
 For summaries of these and other update protocols see Nowak (2006), Hauert (2002), and evoludo.org. 
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simulations that a small effort to foster aggression by the atrocity entrepreneurs could tip an 
otherwise peaceful village into a social metamorphosis in which the whole village comes to 
support aggression.  The tipping can go the other way.  Relatively small but well-timed and well-
located peacekeeping efforts can neutralize the social evolution of aggression and allow peace to 
persist in a village.  The fate of a village can truly hang in the balance between the engineering 
efforts of atrocity entrepreneurs and peacemakers.  Second, geographic space really matters in 
understanding the social evolution of aggression.  Social evolution for highly concentrated 
people in a Moore village can play out very differently over time and space relative to the less 
concentrated people groupings in a von Neumann village and relative to space-less models.  For 
example, “walker” peacekeeping interventions in a Moore village can lead to a “big bang” of 
peace, but the same conditions in a von Neumann village lead to a muted outcome for peace.  We 
also found that the deterministic space-less model leads to definitive outcomes whereas the 
outcomes in models with geographic space can be sensitive to the initial random spatial 
distribution of the population mix.  Third, under conditions in which the social evolution of 
aggression can metastasize within a village, early and well-located (geographically) 
interventions for peace are essential to stop aggressiveness in its tracks.  Fourth, any general 
claims about the ability or inability of peacekeepers to prevent the social evolution of aggression 
should be looked at with suspicion.  Social context is immensely important for understanding 
how people relate or misrelate to one another and such contexts vary widely across the world and 
within states, cities, towns, rural areas, and neighborhoods.  In some social settings, a small 
peacekeeping effort can have dramatic effects in fostering a more peaceful social context among 
people from an in-group.  In other settings, the aggressive fate of the village may be sealed and 
scarce peacekeeping resources might be better deployed elsewhere.   
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Figure 1: Payoffs in Pairwise Encounters in the Evolutionary Game Theory Model 
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Figure 2: Four Cases in the Evolutionary Game Theory Model 
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Figure 3: Engineering the Social Evolution of Aggression 
Panel (a):  Initially   
         
               peacefulness is fitter than aggression 
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Figure 4: Sally’s Spatial Interactions and Payoffs in a Moore Neighborhood 
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Panel (a): Sally chooses peacefulness and has 8 peaceful neighbors  Sally’s payoff =8d 
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Panel (b): Sally chooses peacefulness and has 5 aggressive and 3 peaceful neighbors   Sally’s 
payoff =5c+3d 
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Note: 
When choosing peacefulness, Sally’s payoff from each peaceful neighbor is d and from each aggressive neighbor is 
c based on the stage game in Figure 1. 
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Figure 5: Social Evolution in the Moore Village (for a=1, b=1.5, c=2, d=1,   
         
                                                                        ) 
 
Panel (a): Time period 0 in which 20 percent of village is aggressive type 
 
 
 
Panel (b): Time period 25 in which about 40 percent of the village is aggressive type 
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Figure 6: Social Evolution in the Moore Village (initially for a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2,   
      , N=10,000, Player updates: best 
wins equal stay, Population updates: synchronous) 
 
Panel (a): Social evolution to peacefulness by period 2 Panel (c): Increase in payoff in aggressive/aggressive encounters to 
a=2.7, leading to tipping point for social evolution of aggression 
(period 10)   
 
        
 
Panel (b): Increase in payoff in aggressive/aggressive   Panel (d): Social evolution to aggression for a=2.5, b=1.2, c=0.8, 
encounters to a=2.5 and convergence to 2.8%    d=2,   
       (period 5) 
aggressive types in blocks (period 75) 
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Figure 7: Social Evolution in the von Neumann Village (N=10,000, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates: 
synchronous) 
 
Panel (a): Blocks of aggressive types persist in von Neumann Panel (c): Social evolution of aggression in von Neumann village 
village for a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2,   
       (period 10)  for a=2.4, b=1.2, c=0.8, d=2,   
       (period 100) 
 
   
 
Panel (b): Blocks of aggressive types persist in Moore   Panel (d): Creation of block of aggressive types in northwest 
village for a=2.4, b=1.2, c=0.8, d=2,   
          corner of von Neumann village for a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2,  
(period 1,000)          
      . This and other blocks persist (period 50) 
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Figure 8: Peacekeeping and the Fate of the Moore Village (a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2,   
      , 
N=10,000, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates: synchronous) 
 
Panel (a): Lump of aggressive types emerges Panel (d): Similar period 3 lump of aggressive 
(period 3)       types (period 3) 
 
        
 
Panel (b) Insertion of 15 peacekeepers into  Panel (e): Insertion of 20 peacekeepers into 
the lump (period 3)      the lump (period 3) 
 
    
 
Panel (c): Peacekeepers too little too late.    Panel (f): Aggressive lump is contained  
Lump seriously metastasizing (period 15)  (period 4) 
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Figure 9: “Walkers” and the “Big Bang” of Peace in the Moore Village (a=0, b=1.51, c=0, 
d=1,   
       , N=4,761, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates: 
synchronous) 
 
Panel (a): 2 walker teams of 10 peaceful types Panel (d): By time 15, the big bang of peace 
inserted at time 0     continues to grow 
 
    
 
Panel (b): By time 6, the walker teams are  Panel (e): By time 60, peace is dominant 
close to concentrating 
 
   
 
Panel (c): At time 8, the walkers connect and Panel (f): By time 150, village is mostly  
the “big bang” of peace begins    peaceful with locales of aggressive types 
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Figure 10: Peacekeeping and the Fate of the von Neumann Village (a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2,   
      , N=10,000, Player 
updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates: synchronous) 
 
Panel (a): Blocks of aggressive types emerge by period 3  Panel (c): By time 10, only blocks that had 6 or more aggressive 
         types at time 3 persist 
 
     
 
Panel (b): Insertion of 1 peacekeeper into each   Panel (d): Insertion of 1 peacekeeper into aggressive blocks of 5 or 
aggressive block (period 3)      fewer and 2 peacekeepers into aggressive blocks of 6 or more  
          (period 3) 
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Figure 11: “Walkers” and the “Small Band” of Peace in the von Neumann Village (a=0, 
b=1.51, c=0, d=1,  
       , N=4,761, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population 
updates: synchronous) 
 
Panel (a): 2 walker teams of 10 peaceful types Panel (d): 2 non-overlapping walker teams 
inserted at time 0     of 10 peaceful types inserted at time 0 
 
    
 
Panel (b): By time 6, the walker teams are  Panel (e): By time 25, each walker team 
close to concentrating     is carving out “small band” of peace 
 
   
 
Panel (c): At time 12, the walkers connect but Panel (f): By time 75, the “small bands” of  
a “big bang” of peace does not occur   peace have spread as far as they can 
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Table 1: Four Possible Cases of the Social Evolution of Aggression 
 
1. Case 1: a<c and b<d    Peace dominates 
 Parameters imply aggressiveness unrewarded relative to peacefulness in social 
encounters 
 
2. Case 2: a<c and b>d   Peace and Aggression coexist 
 Parameters imply aggressors relatively well rewarded in social encounters with 
peaceful types 
 
3. Case 3: a>c and b<d   Peace and Aggression bistable 
 Parameters imply aggressors relatively well rewarded in social encounters with other 
aggressors 
 
4. Case 4: a>c and b>d   Aggression dominates 
 Parameters imply aggressiveness rewarded relative to peacefulness in social 
encounters 
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Table 2: Manipulating the Social Genome: Selected Nazi Techniques that Foster the Social 
Evolution of Aggression in the 2x2 Evolutionary Game Model 
 
1. Increase payoffs to aggressive phenotypes in same encounters (increase a) 
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25) 
b. Support of Germanism rewarded in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224) 
 
2. Increase payoffs to aggressive phenotypes in cross encounters (increase b) 
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25) 
b. Appropriation of property from occupied groups (pp. 37-40, 144) 
c. Legal rights of occupied replaced by “grace” of occupant (p. 71) 
d. Support of Germanism rewarded in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224)  
 
3. Decrease payoffs to peaceful phenotypes in cross encounters (decrease c) 
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25) 
b. Appropriation of property from occupied groups (pp. 37-40) 
c. Refuse unemployment relief for those unwilling to work for Germany (p. 69) 
d. Legal rights of occupied replaced by “grace” of occupant (p. 71) 
e. Severe penalties to those who help victim groups (p. 77) 
f. Resistance to Germanism penalized in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224)  
 
4. Decrease payoffs to peaceful phenotypes in same encounters (decrease d) 
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25) 
b. Disrupt centers of political resistance (p. 67) 
c. Separate families (p. 67) 
d. Exclude people from liberal arts education (pp. 84, 229) 
e. Undermine religious affiliations and leadership in occupied territories(p. 89) 
f. Create an atmosphere of moral debasement (pp. 89-90) 
g. Appropriation of the gains from trade within occupied territories (pp. 127, 229) 
h. Imprisonment or liquidation of key leaders (p. 139) 
i. Resistance to Germanism penalized in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224)  
j. Assembly restricted (p. 231) 
 
5. Increase initial ratio of aggressive phenotype in locales (increase   
 ) 
a. Ideological penetration and fifth column support of Nazism (pp. 19, 83, 137, 237) 
b. Mass deportations of native populations (pp. 21, 67) 
c. Subsidies and tax breaks for German settlers in occupied territories (pp. 21, 63, 
225) 
d. Insertion of “colonization staffs” into occupied territories (p. 21) 
e. Currency manipulation to finance insertion of aggressive types into areas (pp. 51-
53) 
 
Notes 
1. The parameters a, b, c, d, and   
 are the parameters of the stage game for the basic model in Figure 1. 
2. The page numbers in the table refer to pages in Raphael Lemkin’s (1944) Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. 
 
